FBI's leaked flyer. Source: Public Intelligence

As you can see it, any use of “anonymizers, portals, or other means to shield IP address” is considered as a suspicious activity such as terrorism. Additionally, if you use encryption or are somehow “overly concerned about privacy” or attempting to “shield the screen from view of others”, you are suspicious of being potentially engaged or supporting terrorists.

This means that using a proxy or the Tor network makes you automatically suspicious. This puts you in the same basket as a woman wanting to remove her nail polisher who buys some acetone or the cute granny from the house around the corner buying fertilizers for her lovely petunia.

But the delirious indications of potential terrorists are not the only concern in this flyer. I am also disturbed by the “Be Part of The Solution” invitation. Actually this transforms a citizen into a walking surveillance device. Either you report what is defined as suspicious and you can help prevent some (un)likely terrorists to commit their rogue acts, or you don't and you are actually in the bad situation of likely supporting these activities… More clearly, if someone uses HTTPS next to you in the library, you should open your eyes and double-check what the person spends his/her spare time on. We missed you, McCarthy…

This flyer is one more amongst the already rich collection of 25 such documents the FBI has produced and gathered under the name “Communities Against Terrorism”. They are aimed at being widely distributed and provide some basic tools for ordinary people to report “suspicious activity”. The latter can be encountered in quite a few threat areas such as airport service providers, hobby shops or tattoo shops… You might also remember the case of the Casio F-91W digital watch that was claimed to be used in terrorism. More notably, as The Guardian was telling it, this watch was “the sign of al-Qaida” and the mere fact of possessing it was considered as a contributing factor to continued detention at Guantanamo Bay detention camp. This would sound funny if it was not tragic: a whole list of detainees exists…

Who is next? The EFF for promoting HTTPS Everywhere, the guys from the Tor project for providing a tool to protect your online privacy or myself as any security-conscious employee for using a VPN to connect from home to my computer at work in the week-end?

Written by Malicia Rogue · comments (2)
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These questions provide the general framework for discussion in Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle For Internet Freedom, a new book by Rebecca McKinnon, co-founder of Global Voices (and co-author of the twice-monthly Netizen Report on GV Advocacy).

A comprehensive and timely effort, it is a call to action for every blogger or user of Twitter or Facebook, and particularly for cyber-activists at large, to collectively address the urgent issue of how technology should be governed to support the rights and liberties of citizens around the world. With a rigorous analysis and a positive tone, the final message is to get involved in a struggle that all of us have the power and ability to influence (even in small ways), if we only try to understand the complex forces at work, and how we might help shape them.

Divided in five major sections (Disruptions; Control 2.0; Democracy’s challenges; Sovereigns of cyberspace; What is to be done?), the book covers a variety of events over the past decade and is quite up to date, with parts devoted to the Arab Spring and the Egyptian government’s surveillance capabilities, privacy and control in Western democracies, and the rise of “Facebookistan and Googledom”. The book's companion website offers fresh updates and more resources.

The Global Voices network is mentioned here and there, with direct quotes and references. For instance, the book preface speaks briefly about the community's inception, growth, and crucial role in recent events:

As protests erupted in Tunisia in late 2010 and demonstrations spread around the Middle East and North Africa in early 2011, Global Voices contributors worked around the clock to spread information about what was happening in multiple languages, on our own site as well as Twitter, Facebook, and other social media platforms.

The first part of the book focuses on interconnections in technology, society and business that fueled the Internet's development so far, giving rise to a “digital commons” that includes innovative practices, digital activism, and people's empowerment. This is an exciting environment that nonetheless faces opposition, defined as “Control 2.0”: “…how opaque, unaccountable relationships with Internet and telecommunications companies enables authoritarian governments to control and manipulate citizens.”

China is a primary case study here, with a detailed description of its refined censorship system and recent developments to maintain authoritarian control, while at the same time enabling, “…high levels of lively and even contentious online debate and deliberation, within certain limits.”

After describing similar (or worse) situations in countries such as Iran, Pakistan and Syria, the focus shifts to Western democracies — who unfortunately appear inclined to emulate authoritarian regimes, even if in subtle and insidious ways. That is, technology companies are establishing equally opaque and unaccountable relationships with government agencies, and fail to, “…take responsibility for their power over citizens’ political lives, and their lack of accountability in the exercise of that power.”

Image © Shutterstock.com

The various examples discussed here include WikiLeaks, privacy complaints on Facebook, ‘Big Brother' Apple, and Net Neutrality. Along with the on-going battle about intellectual property vs. free speech and sharing (see the global initiative against SOPA-PIPA, and the recent ‘selective censorship‘ announced by Twitter). Also addressed are lesser-known issues, such as a 2011 proposal to create a “single European cyberspace” that would block “illicit content” at Europe’s borders.

Finally, the last section of the book attempts to answer the question of “What is to be done?”, proposing the development of a Netizen-centric Internet. This part explores efforts by some governments, a few companies, and a growing number of concerned citizens to address the threats to freedom in cyberspace through new initiatives and movements. Some suggestions include: boosting corporate transparency; building processes for corporate engagement with users, customers, and other stakeholders; and building a more citizen-driven information environment.

At the end of the day, this Struggle For Internet Freedom is taking place here and now — in Arab countries, in East Asia and even in Western nations. It is a common struggle, and it is up to each and all of us, as netizens and citizens of the world, to monitor the state of affairs and make sure the Internet remains a force for freedom of expression and political liberation — rather than a tool for alienation, censorship and repression.

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—

It has been six years since the highly controversial Data Retention Directive (DRD) was adopted in the European Union. Conceived in the EU and steamrolled by powerful U.S. and U.K. government lobbies, this mass-surveillance law compels EU-based Internet service providers to collect and retain traffic data revealing who communicates with whom by email, phone, and SMS, including the duration of the communication and the locations of the users. This data is often made available to law enforcement. Europeans have widely criticized the DRD, and year after year, it has inspired some of the largest-ever street protests against excessive surveillance.

The European Commission has begun mounting a defense for this highly controversial mass-surveillance scheme, though they have thus far been unable to show that the DRD is necessary or proportionate. For the DRD to be legal in the EU, any limitation to the right to privacy must be “necessary” to achieve an objective of general interest and “proportionate” to the desired aim. This requirement is important to ensure that the government does not adopt severe measures to address a problem that could be otherwise solved in a way that is less harmful to civil liberties.  But the Commission has been arguing that all uses of retained data illustrate that the Directive is “valuable.” This doesn’t meet the legal standard. Instead, the Commission should provide evidence that in the absence of a mandatory data retention law, traffic data crucial to the investigation of “serious crime” would not have been available to law enforcement.

Despite the European Commission’s efforts to preserve the Directive as-is, a leaked letter confirms that the Commission has been scrambling to conjure evidence for the “need” of a DRD scheme in the European Union. It also underscores the fact that there is no system of oversight that would allow citizens to monitor the impact of the proposed program on their privacy rights. Perhaps the most disquieting detail that has been confirmed by the letter is that service providers have already been storing instant messages, chats, uploads, and downloads. This type of data collection falls outside the scope of the DRD. Moreover, the letter indicates that “unnamed” players seek to broaden the uses of the DRD to include prosecution of copyright infringement including “illegally downloading.” Since this is not a serious crime, this legally falls outside the scope of the DRD.

In response to this leak, EDRI stated, “The leaked document however shows that the Commission can neither prove necessity nor proportionality of the Data Retention Directive - but still wants to keep the Directive.” The leaked letter also disclosed that the EU Commission is evaluating the possibility of amending the Directive. The Commission has commissioned a study into data preservation in the EU and around the world. According to the letter, this exercise is to be completed by May 2012.

Ending Data Retention: Constitutional Challenges

Constitutional courts have begun weighing in on the legality of this mass-surveillance scheme. In a decision celebrated by privacy advocates, the Czech Constitutional Court declared in March 2011 that the Czech data retention law was unconstitutional. Earlier this month, the same Court dealt another blow to data retention by annulling part of the Criminal Procedure Code, which would have enabled law enforcement access to data stored voluntarily by operators. Most importantly, the Czech Court used compelling language in articulating the importance of the protection of traffic data. The Court stated that the collection of traffic data and communication data warranted identical legal safeguards since both have the same “intensity of interference”.

We couldn't agree more. Sensitive data of this nature demands stronger protection, not an all-access pass. Individuals should not have to worry whether one sort of private information has less protection than another.

Jan Vobořil of Iuridicum Remedium, which led the legal complaint against the Czech data retention law, told EFF:

I believe that both decisions will help ensure that new legislation enforces the same restrictions as exist for use of wiretap. These include strong privacy safeguards for government access to citizen's data, the obligation to inform individuals about the use of their data, and so on.

Several other courts in EU member states have also ruled on the illegality of data retention laws. Earlier in 2009, the Romanian constitutional Court rejected the imposition of an ongoing, sweeping traffic data retention program. The Court rightly emphasized that mandatory data retention overturns the presumption of innocence in a way that treats all Romanians like potential suspects. Despite this court decision, a new draft data retention bill was introduced in the Parliament, but the Senate finally rejected it at the end of 2011.

In March 2010, the German Court declared unconstitutional the German mandatory data retention law. The Court ordered the deletion of the collected data and affirmed that data retention could “cause a diffusely threatening feeling of being under observation that can diminish an unprejudiced perception of one's basic rights in many areas.” The lawsuit was brought on by 34,000 citizens through the initiative of AK Vorrat, the German working group against data retention.

Over in Ireland, the Court is referring to the European Court of Justice the case challenging the legality of the DRD, thanks to the complaint brought by Digital Rights Ireland. The Irish Court acknowledged the importance of defining “the legitimate legal limits of surveillance techniques used by governments”, and rightly emphasized that “without sufficient legal safeguards the potential for abuse and unwarranted invasion of privacy is obvious”. The Courts in Cyprus and Bulgaria have also declared their mandatory data retention laws unconstitutional.

The DRD compels EU member countries to implement the Directive into national law. Fortunately, many member states have not yet done so. The Czech Republic, Germany, Greece, Romania, and Sweden have not adopted this piece of legislation, despite pressure from the European Commission to do so. In Austria, the data protection law will take effect in April 2012.  AK Vorrat Austria plans to use all legal means to challenge the legality of the DRD. They have also handed over a petition to the Austrian Parliament asking the government to fight against the DRD at the EU level and to review all existing anti-terror legislation. (If you are Austrian, sign the petition today at zeichnemit.at.) In Slovakia, the NGO European Information Society Institute is opposing the Slovakian data retention implementation law.

Meanwhile, civil society groups are resisting and campaigning against this oppressive data retention law. EDRI, along with EFF and AK Vorrat, has fought to repeal the DRD in favor of targeted collection of traffic data. EDRI has previously reported that Deutsche Telekom, a German telco, illegally used telecommunications traffic and location data to spy on roughly 60 individuals including journalists, managers, and union leaders. They also reported that two major intelligence agencies in Poland used retained traffic and subscriber data to illegally disclose journalistic sources without any judicial oversight. These are only a few examples in which data retention policies have directly threatened individuals’ expression and privacy rights.

The DRD is a threat to Internet privacy and anonymity, and has been proven to violate the privacy rights of 500 million Europeans. EFF, together with EDRI, will keep fighting to repeal the DRD in favor of targeted collection of traffic data.

Mandatory Data Retention in the United States

Two bills introduced in the U.S. Congress in 2009 would have required all Internet providers and operators of WiFi access points to keep records on Internet users for at least two years to assist police investigations. Neither bill became law. Some legislators and law enforcement officials continue to argue, however, that mandatory data retention is necessary to investigate online child pornography and other Internet crimes. In January 2011, the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security held a hearing that discussed whether Congress should pass legislation that would force ISPs and telecom providers to log Internet user traffic data. In May 2011, H.R. 1981, which would require retention of such traffic data, was introduced in the House of Representatives. This bill is still alive and continues to be a threat to the privacy and anonymity of all Americans. EFF has joined civil liberties and consumer organizations in publicly opposing H.R. 1981. Please join EFF, and help us defeat this bill before it is made law. Contact your Representative now.

Katitza Rodriguez is International Rights Director at the Electronic Frontier Foundation. @txitua

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In an interview with a radio station, Boni said [pl] that it was impossible not to sign the agreement, because it was too late: Poland joined the negotiation process in 2008 and all the other European countries have already signed it. He added that Poland “should attach a clause to the treaty that would show how we interpret these articles”. Boni promised [pl] broad public consultations during the European ratification process. Several Polish NGOs expressed [pl] their disappointment with the government's stance on ACTA and appealed to change the decision.

Since January 21, online hackers calling themselves Anonymous have been attacking and shuting down government websites almost constantly, in a chaotic protest against the plans to sign the international treaty on Thursday.

TANGO DOWN: User @Anonymouswiki owns up to the web attacks on the websites of the prime minister, the parliament and other government entities. Screenshot: Twitter @Anonymouswiki

Although the hackers still enjoy a strong support among netizens, and the attacks were one of the reasons the mainstream media picked up the topic of ACTA, the group also faces criticism from the major Polish tech-bloggers. Maciej Gajewski from Spidersweb calls them [pl] “crying kids worried for their mp3″ and regrets that they became the face of the protest giving the government officials an argument against the movement:

Critics, mistrust and suspicion is one thing, but panic, mumbling and spreading disinformation is another thing. Looking at some finds on the biggest Polish social news platforms, looking at the comments of some readers, I get the impression that the lion's share of the protesters have no idea what ACTA is about. They've made up fantastic stories and are passing them on. The mass is getting crazy “Impale PM”, “Let's burn the Minister on the stake!”, “They will all lock us down in prisons!”. And then also Anonymous, who just make the whole protest look ridiculous in the eyes of mature older voters.

Over 900 Polish websites went dark on January 24

As opposed to the web attacks on government websites, Antyweb called [pl] on his blog on January 23 for a protest “in a cultured way, namely, a blackout” and provided a script and an instruction on how to do it. In response, more than 900 websites decided to “go dark” and display an anti-ACTA message. Allegro, the Polish equivalent of Ebay, placed an “anti-ACTA” banner next to the company's logo. The list of the websites taking part in the protest is available here.

"This is what the Internet might look like very soon. NO to ACTA" - over 900 Polish websites decided to go dark on January 24 in protest against the treaty. Screenshot: http://spiderweb.pl

The opposition party, the Democratic Left Alliance, also said the government should not sign the agreement and blackouted its website [pl] in solidarity.

While the global media, with a few exceptions, keep silent about the Polish protest, national information services race to publish dozens of opinions, analyses and the latest reports on the ACTA case. In the meantime, the protest movement seems to be getting bigger and bigger: the anti-ACTA protest event on Facebook Nie dla ACTA has reached over 400,000 fans. A real-life protest in Warsaw gathered [pl] over 1,000 people on Tuesday, and another one is being planned for Wednesday, January 25.

"Screw corporations, long live the people": many Polish protesters went on the streets on January 24. Photo by Alexey Sidorenko, used with permission.

Vagla, a popular Polish digital rights blogger, shared this hope [pl] on Twitter on January 24:

I guess that slowly people start to understand that this is not a discussion about “piracy” and “thieves” but about the direction in which our civilisation is heading.

***

Update:

Later on January 24, PM Tusk confirmed officially [pl] at a press conference that Poland will sign ACTA on January 26. At the same time, he stressed that the government will not give in to blackmail, meaning the earlier web attacks. Poland strives for internet freedom, said Tusk.

Written by Katarzyna Odrozek · comments (12)
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On January 19, during a meeting with NGOs and business representatives, the Polish government announced [pl] that it would sign the controversial anti-piracy agreement ACTA on January 26. While the governement calls it a success [pl] of the Polish EU Presidency, netizens are outraged with the arbitrary decision and are calling to take action against the proposal.

Image by flickr user PateandoPiedrasweb under the CC BY-NC-SA 2.0 licence.

ACTA, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, is a proposed plurilateral agreement for the purpose of establishing international standards on intellectual property rights enforcement. According to La Quadrature du Net and other globally active digital rights organisations, such as Electronic Frontier Foundation or European Digital Rights, ACTA would impose new criminal sanctions forcing Internet actors to monitor and censor online communications. Creating legal uncertainty for Internet companies, ACTA would become a major threat to freedom of expression online and another assault against the culture of sharing on the Internet.

The decision of the Polish government [pdf, pl] to sign the “European SOPA” worries [pl] blogger Maciej Gajewski from the tech website Spiderweb.pl:

Lately, one talks a lot about SOPA and PIPA bills and this is very good: in my opinion, these are the reprehensible bills and I think that the goal should never justify the means. For the Polish netizens the consequences of these two bills are negligible. If they were adopted, they would concern us only regarding the possibility to block our website for people in the USA. And that's actually it. But meanwhile, just in one week, our country, as a country subordinated to the European Union, will join the ACTA agreement. And this can hurt us. Very much.

An agreement negotiated behind the people's backs

But it's not only the content of the agreement proposal that upsets the netizens. The very secret character of the international ACTA negotiations and a stunning lack of public consultations and transparency in the negotiating process are clearly pointing to a democracy failure, according to [pl] Antyweb, a popular Polish tech-blogger:

They promised debates - nothing. They promised openness - nothing. Democracy is being destroyed, the deputies don't know what they are signing, and all this will lead to a situation when bloggers, scientists and entrepreneurs will be qualified as criminals. And if not, they will anyway walk on thin ice, paying attention not to step on a patent spot with an additinal R letter in a circle on the right side.

The digital rights blog Prawo.vagla.pl criticises [pl] the scandalous ignorance of the Polish government:

We found out that, of course, it's no longer possible to withdraw the decision about the signature of a Polish representative on the ACTA document, that this signature will be put and it will open the way to the ratification procedure. I asked the representatives of these ministries if they had any plan in case the European or the Polish Parliament would not not agree to the ratification. I heard that “it would put us to shame.” I wonder what is a bigger shame, and if it's not maybe the way of working on this kind of an international agreement where the public opinion couldn't get the public information it deserves.

In reaction to the netizens' protest, the Polish Minister of Administration and Digitalisation, Michal Boni [pl], asked [pl] the PM Donald Tusk to re-discuss the agreement before signing it. The meeting [pl] will take place on January 24.

ACTA has to be stopped

In the meantime the Polish Internet is fuming with anger. Facebook pages, such as Poland against ACTA & SOPA and NIE dla ACTA w Polsce, spring up like mushrooms and gather hundreds of thousands of netizens around the protest. On the wall of the Facebook event Nie dla ACTA, Rafal Mirski writes [pl]:

I am in favor of intellectual property protection but not with these methods! This is throwing the baby out with the bath water. You can't allow to subordinate the whole Internet to any group of interest. ACTA is forcing Internet providers to censorship! And it is in fact puzzling how fast, without any public debate, one tries to dictate some solutions. We definitely have to stop it!

Maciej Gajewski from Spiderweb doesn't like [pl] the perspective of being monitored all the time:

First of all: although I don't share anything illegal on the net, I don't feel comfortable knowing that somebody is registering my every step on the Internet. Even if it's an automatic machine. Secondly, these will cause huge costs for the providers. Our activity has to be monitored and archived. Let's prepare for a big raise of Internet prices.

Polish digital rights organisations sent an appeal [pdf, pl] to the PM, drawing his attention to the risks of ACTA. On Wykop, a Polish version of Digg, user katius posted a protest letter [pl] to the Members of the Parliament, encouraging other users to address their representatives with the issue. A series of live protest events [pl] in the biggest Polish cities are planned to take place.

A Polish Blackout?

Encouraged by the SOPA/PIPA protest success in the United States, blogger Antyweb calls on his blog [pl] for a Polish blackout:

We have to arrange a specific date (pretty fast) and switch off in the Polish web whatever we can while displaying information about ACTA and about damaging democracy. We need to draw peoples' attention to the fact that this is not the way to take decisions in a modern democratic state. Americans could make it, Poles can do it as well - especially the “internet”-ones. What about Monday, [January 23]? But which of the Polish websites will give up money in the name of defending democracy and free Internet?

Also, the Polish Wikipedia community is considering a blackout [pl] and is in the process of editing an anti-ACTA manifest [pl].

Last hope: European Parliament's veto right

The whole situation looks a bit less dramatic once we consider that the Polish signature alone doesn't change anything yet. The agreement needs to be ratified by the European Parliament. Antyweb writes [pl]:

If we want to fight ACTA, then we need to do it on the European Parliament level - it is there where ACTA will have its “to be or not to be.” The EP can dismiss ACTA completely and then the bill lands in trash. Amen. But it doesn't change the fact that it is worthy to take action on January 26.

As promising as it sounds, isn't it quite dissapointing that instead of counting on one's own government to protect civil and digital rights of its citizens, one has to rely on the reason of EU politicians? Twitter user @PrzemoBrozek sums it up [pl]:

On January 26 Poland will sign ACTA. According to the agreement, Internet providers will have to monitor all users' activities. 1984 MODE ON.

***

Update:

On January 21, around 7 PM, Anonymous hackers have blocked access to the websites of the Sejm, the lower Chamber of the Polish Parliament, the Chancellery of the PM, the President, and the Ministry of Culture. At the time of writing this article, the websites are still offline.

Written by Katarzyna Odrozek · comments (3)
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Yesterday was a defining moment for the global Internet community. The effects of the massive online blackout in protest of U.S. Internet blacklist legislation, SOPA and PIPA (H.R. 3261 and S. 968), were felt around the world as countless numbers of websites, including Google, Wikipedia, Mozilla, Reddit, BoingBoing, Flickr, Wired, and many others joined in the global action against over-broad and poorly drafted copyright laws that would break the fundamental architecture of the Internet. To quote [pdf] last year’s landmark Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion: “…Censorship measures should never be delegated to a private entity, and [..] no one should be held liable for content on the Internet of which they are not the author…” The massive opposition from both companies and individuals around the world demonstrates how much these and similar laws would hurt business and innovation, and most importantly, restrict online free expression.

But SOPA and PIPA are really only the tip of the iceberg. The same forces behind these domestic U.S. laws have continued to both push for other states to pass similar domestic laws, as well as to secretly negotiate international trade agreements that would force signatory nations to conform to the same legal standards. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Ley Doring (Mexico), Ley Sinde (Spain), Ley Hadopi (France) are only a few examples. Members of the copyright industry lobby such as the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the International Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI) are funneling huge amounts of resources into getting states to pass inherently flawed copyright enforcement laws. What results are laws that encroach on national sovereignty, overstep traditional principles of jurisdiction, harm innovation, and ultimately violate users’ rights.

Digital civil liberties activists and organizations internationally found the day of online action to be a golden opportunity to educate their constituents on the effects such laws would have on websites in their countries and the future of the free and open Internet. Recognizing the common thread of overbroad enforcement and technical defects that runs through these bills, the following organizations have taken a stance against the efforts of special interests to censor citizens and kill innovation in the name of preserving the entertainment industry’s business model.

U.S. spreads overbroad IP enforcement measures through secretive international agreements and threats towards trade sanctions

In recent years major copyright industry lobbyists have sought stronger power to enforce their copyrights across the world to preserve their business models. These efforts have been underway in a number of international fora including the G8 summit, transnational trade agreements such as ACTA and TPP, and the Annual Special 301 Process–a report with tiered “watch lists” of countries with supposedly deficient intellectual property laws and enforcement policies. As U.S. Public Interest Groups and EU Scholars have noted, SOPA includes a provision designed to further entrench U.S. IP rightsholders’ influence on other countries’ laws and policies. While the passage of SOPA and PIPA could certainly have longstanding consequences for societies and economies around the world, we hope the enormous attention shed on these two Internet blacklist bills raises international awareness of the impact of these copyright enforcement proposals sought by U.S. IP rightsholders worldwide.

La Quadrature Du Net, a French-based advocacy organization, stated:

This site has gone dark today in protest of the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and PROTECT-IP Act (PIPA) discussed in the US Congress, as well as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), currently debated in the European Parliament. These initiatives amount to a global attempt to censor the Internet in the name of copyright.

The Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic (CIPPIC), a Canadian-based advocacy group stated:

[SOPA and PIPA] is yet one more example of the harms that can result for an overly aggressive, no holds barred, U.S.-driven IP agenda. It imposes more restrictive standards on foreign intermediaries than the U.S. requires of its own Internet companies through its DMCA notice-takedown regime.

The Chilean digital rights advocacy group, Derechos Digitales, also framed their position against SOPA in light of the overreaching international copyright enforcement regimes:

So while many of us speak out against the U.S. bill, the governments of Chile, Peru, New Zealand, Australia, Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia and the United States are moving quickly on a new international agreement that reproduces one of the greatest threats of SOPA: censorship of Internet sites for possible infringements of copyright, giving police powers to Internet service providers. (Read here and here in Spanish)

Markus Beckedahl, Chairman of Digitale Gesellschaft, a German User Rights Group, explained to the German public:

If only half of the proposed legislation comes into force, this is going to have a huge negative impact on the internet. ACTA, PIPA and SOPA are of similar kind: Music and film industries try to destroy the net slice for slice – the so called salami tactics.

Read more here, here, here, and here (in German)

SOPA and PIPA would disrupt national sovereignty and harm local economies

In countries where policymakers are currently debating the need for website blocking proposals, the adoption of SOPA or PIPA will create pressure to mirror U.S. law regardless of any empirical evidence of its effectiveness or appropriateness. What is most disconcerting for individuals and enterprises outside the U.S. is the way in which SOPA and PIPA could effectively override their countries' national laws and impose more restrictive standards on foreign Internet intermediaries than it does on U.S. Internet companies.

50 human rights organizations from around the world signed a letter to U.S. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid in opposition to PIPA, highlighting its serious jurisdictional and freedom of expression concerns:

…Creating a mechanism that requires a representative of a website to make a court appearance in the U.S. in order to defend themselves against an allegation of infringement would disproportionately impact smaller online communities and start-ups based abroad that do not have the capacity to address concerns in the United States.

Open Rights Group based in the United Kingdom also emphasized the due process implications of these overbroad U.S. Internet blacklist bills:

There are two reasons that Open Rights Group are supporting a protest aimed at US laws. First, the overly broad definitions and wording of the bills put any websites at risk of action from US authorities. Second, we face many of the issues with these copyright-related bills here in the UK: inappropriate enforcement measures, in particular website blocking; overly-broad or vague definitions and wording; and weaknesses in due process and redress.

Michael Geist, a leading Canadian legal scholar on digital civil liberties and copyright, drew attention to the impact SOPA would have in Canada and its parallels with ACTA and TPP:

While SOPA is proposed U.S. legislation, it has implications for all Canadians, including provisions that treat all Canadian IP addresses as if they were subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Moreover, Canada faces the same relentless copyright lobbying campaign. From the much-criticized digital lock rules found in Bill C-11 to the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement to the proposal to extend the term of copyright protection in the Trans Pacific Partnership, Canadian copyright policy is increasingly shaped by the same groups promoting SOPA.

Global Voices Online, an international community of bloggers around the world, told their readers:

[PIPA/SOPA] would raise the cost of participation on [social media and other user generated sites] for all users worldwide, and could force many social media projects to shut down, especially smaller websites and businesses.

OpenMedia.ca, a Canadian-based advocacy group, warned:

As Canadian Internet users and online innovators, we have a lot to lose if SOPA is passed. SOPA could fundamentally reshape the Internet in the U.S., Canada, and the rest of the world. … Tell Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Gary Doer (Canada’s Ambassador to the U.S.) that Canadians are against SOPA.

Threatens human rights and access to information worldwide

Most of the criticism regarding SOPA and PIPA has focused on the way the bills would institute massive online censorship and fundamentally break the Internet in the name of intellectual property enforcement. These bills would encompass any foreign site accessible from the U.S. and give corporations and other private parties new powers to censor websites from around the world with court orders that would cut off domain names, payment processors, and advertisers.

Internet Governance Caucus, an international coalition of civil society organizations and individuals around the world participating at the UN Internet Governance Forum reaffirmed the free speech implications of Internet blacklist legislation:

We have made a decision to join the black out in protest of the arbitrary censorship of the Internet which violates people’s rights to responsibly use the Internet. We note with increasing concern the the various censorship mechanisms around the world including but not limited to India’s Intermediary Guideline Rules (IGR) nor the United States of America’s Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA)and Protect IP Act (PIPA). Any country’s censorship mechanisms affect ordinary Internet users all over the world.

Amnesty International, a globally recognized organization fighting injustice and promoting human rights, noted that “[PIPA and SOPA] would create a powerful and unprecedented market incentive to censor user generated content. And their passage would signal very clearly to countries around the world that it is OK to sacrifice some rights in the name of some other good.”

Greenpeace, a global environmental organization sharply denounced the laws:

If SOPA/PIPA become law, sites like Greenpeace.org could go dark simply because one of our corporate targets files a claim that its intellectual property rights have been violated. No proof required, no court hearing.

Article 19, an international freedom of expression organization, stated:

[PIPA/SOPA] will stifle free speech, innovation and undermine Internet security, all for the sake of Hollywood studios.

Wednesday’s blackout day signifies a new era for the global digital civil liberties movement. Through blogs, tweets, and posts, thousands of organizations, activists, and individuals truly made it the success that it was. This has only been a sample of the great advocacy work that took place yesterday. Here are some other organizations, groups, activists and even political parties who participated on this very important day for the future of the Internet:

• Association for Progressive Communications (International)
• Asociacion de Internautas (Spain) reported that over a hundred Spanish pages–including their own–went dark in solidarity with their American counterparts.
• BytesforAll (Pakistan)
• Center for Technology and Society, Fundacao Getulio Vargas (Brazil) here, here and here.
• European Digital Rights (28 privacy and civil rights organizations members based in Europe)
• Fundacion Via Libre (Argentina)
• Global Voices Advocacy (International)
• GreenPeace (Chile)
• GreenLeft (Netherlands) - green political party
• Green Party (Germany) - green political party
• Internet Society India Chennai
• Nupef (Brazil)
• Pirate Parties of UK, Spain, Argentina, Sweden, Canada, and more
• Revista do Terceiro Setor (RETS), Brazil
• Reporters Without Borders (RSF)

Written by Katitza Rodriguez · comments (9)
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Ignoring the warnings of citizens and technologists, United States lawmakers are considering two bills, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA), that are a real and dangerous threat to the openness of the web everywhere in the world. In response, the Global Voices community has decided to join websites such as Wikipedia, Reddit and BoingBoing in “going dark” and will black out the Global Voices Advocacy site for 12 hours on January 18, and display a banner on other Global Voices sites that provides more information about the proposed bills.

We are an international volunteer community dedicated to amplifying citizen media from around the world. In the last six years, we’ve produced more than 75,000 posts that link to blogs and other citizen content for readers in over 20 languages. Our content is free to use, and free to share. We rely on the open Internet to carry out our mission, and on social media and citizen media websites that allow for simple publication and sharing of content. Platforms like WordPress, Wikipedia, Twitter, YouTube, Flickr, Reddit, Tumblr, and many other online media production communities host content on which we base much of our work.

The passage of SOPA and PIPA by the United States Congress and Senate would force social media platforms and other web sites that host user-generated content to pro-actively monitor and censor users to prevent them from posting words or images that may violate copyrights. It would raise the cost of participation on these sites for all users worldwide, and could force many social media projects to shut down, especially smaller websites and businesses.

We are concerned this law would will inflict broad damage on the work of digital activists living under repressive regimes, as well as restrict basic speech freedoms around the world. Current copyright laws are occasionally misused in the U.S, and can result in de facto speech restrictions. In countries with less independent judicial systems, abuse of copyright law to repress activism is both simple and frequent.

Global Voices contributors in many countries face increasingly aggressive surveillance and censorship. Several are in prison or exile because of their online activities. Passage of these bills will send a clear message that the US government believes it is acceptable to monitor and censor citizens to identify “infringing activity” which too often is equated with political and religious dissent. Passage of SOPA and PIPA would also give the United States government a disproportionate amount of power to determine the course of the Internet. The result will be a more dangerous world for bloggers and activists, and less free speech for all.

Even though the current version of SOPA was put indefinitely on hold this week, PIPA, the Senate version of the bill, is still alive. And the issues and forces that are driving the passage of a law remain. For this reason, Global Voices is joining the Internet blackout on January 18, 2012.

Recent Global Voices Advocacy posts on SOPA/PIPA:

• Trevor Tim, ”How PIPA and SOPA Violate White House Principles Supporting Free Speech and Innovation”
• Katitza Rodriguez, “SOPA undermines the U.S. in its negotiations for a free, open Internet”
• Weiping Li, “For Chinese Netizens, SOPA is Another Great Firewall”
• Yoo Eun Lee, “Stop Online Piracy Act: The Fight Continues”

Other resources for understanding the effects of SOPA/PIPA:

• Joi Ito and Ethan Zuckerman, “Why we need to stop SOPA and PIPA”
• “Internet Blacklist Legislation“, Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF's email campaign against the legislation and EFF guide to meeting with your representatives. EFF also explains how SOPA/PIPA will hurt open source software creation.
• Dan Rowinsky, “What You Need to Know about SOPA in 2012“, ReadWriteWeb
• Wikipedia, “Stop Online Piracy Act”
• Rebecca MacKinnon and Ivan Sigal, “Online piracy laws must preserve Web freedom, CNN.”

What you can do:

• If you are an American citizen, Americancensorship.org can help you to quickly communicate with your elected representatives, or help you to join the strike. Learn more about the strike at www.sopastrike.com.

Written by Ivan Sigal · comments (3)
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Yet, the fight is still far from over. Even though the New York Times reported that the White House statement “all but kill[s] current versions of the legislation,” the Senate is still poised to bring PIPA to the floor next week, and we can expect SOPA proponents in the House to try to revive the legislation—unless they get the message that these initiatives must stop, now.  So let’s take a look at the dangerous provisions in the blacklist bills that would violate the White House’s own principles by damaging free speech, Internet security, and online innovation:

The Anti-Circumvention Provision

In addition to going after websites allegedly directly involved in copyright infringement, a proposal in SOPA will allow the government to target sites that simply provide information that could help users get around the bills’ censorship mechanisms. Such a provision would not only amount to an unconstitutional prior restraint against protected speech, but would severely damage online innovation. And contrary to claims by SOPA’s supporters, this provision—at least what’s been proposed so far—applies to all websites, even those in the U.S. 

As First Amendment expert Marvin Ammori points out, “The language is pretty vague, but it appears all these companies must monitor their sites for anti-circumvention so they are not subject to court actions ‘enjoining’ them from continuing to provide ‘such product or service.’” That means social media sites like Facebook or YouTube—basically any site with user generated content—would have to police their own sites, forcing huge liability costs onto countless Internet companies. This is exactly why venture capitalists have said en masse they won’t invest in online startups if PIPA and SOPA pass. Websites would be forced to block anything from a user post about browser add-ons like DeSopa, to a simple list of IP addresses of already-blocked sites.

Perhaps worse, EFF has detailed how this provision would also decimate the open source software community. Anyone who writes or distributes Virtual Private Network, proxy, privacy or anonymization software would be negatively affected. This includes organizations that are funded by the State Department to create circumvention software to help democratic activists get around authoritarian regimes’ online censorship mechanisms. Ironically, SOPA would not only institute the same practices as these regimes, but would essentially outlaw the tools used by activists to circumvent censorship in countries like Iran and China as well.

The “Vigilante” Provision

Another dangerous provision in PIPA and SOPA that hasn’t received a lot of attention is the “vigilante” provision, which would grant broad immunity to all service providers if they overblock innocent users or block sites voluntarily with no judicial oversight at all. The standard for immunity is incredibly low and the potential for abuse is off the charts. Intermediaries only need to act “in good faith” and base their decision “on credible evidence” to receive immunity.

As we noted months ago, this provision would allow the MPAA and RIAA to create literal blacklists of sites they want censored. Intermediaries will find themselves under pressure to act to avoid court orders, creating a vehicle for corporations to censor sites—even those in the U.S.—without any legal oversight. And as Public Knowledge has pointed out, not only can this provision be used for bogus copyright claims that are protected by fair use, but large corporations can take advantage of it to stamp out emerging competitors and skirt anti-trust laws:

For instance, an Internet service provider could block DNS requests for a website offering online video that competed with its cable television offerings, based upon “credible evidence” that the site was, in its own estimation, promoting its use for infringement….While the amendment requires that the action be taken in good faith, the blocked site now bears the burden of proving either its innocence or the bad faith of its accuser in order to be unblocked.

Corporate Right of Action

PIPA and SOPA also still allow copyright holders to get an unopposed court order to cut off foreign websites from payment processors and advertisers. As we have continually highlighted, copyright holders already can remove infringing material from the web under the DMCA notice-and-takedown procedure. Unfortunately, we’ve seen that power abused time and again. Yet the proponents of PIPA and SOPA want to give rightsholders even more power, allowing them to essentially shut down full sites instead of removing the specific infringing content.

While this provision only affects foreign sites, it still affects Americans' free speech rights. As Marvin Ammori explained, “The seminal case of Lamont v. Postmaster makes it clear that Americans have the First Amendment right to read and listen to foreign speech, even if the foreigners lack a First Amendment speech right.” If history is any guide—and we’re afraid it is—we will see specious claims to wholesale take downs of legitimate and protected speech.

Expanded Attorney General Powers

PIPA and SOPA would also give the Attorney General new authority to block domain name services, a provision that has been universally criticized by both Internet security experts and First Amendment scholars. Even the blacklist bills’ authors are now publicly second-guessing that scary provision. But even without it, this section would still force many intermediaries to become the Internet police by putting the responsibility of censorship enforcement on those intermediaries, who are usually innocent third parties.

The Attorney General would also be empowered to de-list websites from search engines, which, as Google Chairman Eric Schmidt noted, would still “criminalize linking and the fundamental structure of the Internet itself.”  The same applies to payment processors and advertisers.

These are just some of the egregious provisions in PIPA and SOPA that would drastically change the way we use the Internet (for the worse), and punish millions of innocent users who have never even thought about copyright infringement. As Reddit co-founder Alexis Ohanian explained, PIPA and SOPA are “the equivalent of being angry and trying to take action against Ford just because a Mustang was used in a bank robbery.” These bills must be stopped if we want to protect free speech and innovation on the web. 

Please take action now and tell your Congressional representatives you oppose the blacklist bills.

Cross-posted at the Electronic Frontier Foundation.

Written by Trevor Timm · comments (25)
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Las cuentas de venezolanos con visiones críticas ante las políticas del gobierno, ubicados en distintos campos como el periodismo, la economía, la vida universitaria, los derechos humanos, la cultura y la justicia, entre otros, han sido “hackeadas” por individuos que asumen esa tarea agresora como un mecanismo de defensa del proceso político impulsado por el presidente Hugo Chávez.

Iria Puyosa (@NSC) tweeted a screen capture of the Twitter account from where the menaces are coming:

Díaz, besides being a human rights activist and GV contributor, also works as Coordinator of the Communication and Networks of the Gumilla Center, a center for research and social action led by the Society of Jesus in Venezuela.

On Twitter, users have pronounced against the harassment suffered by Luis Carlos:

@Jogreg: @N33DOS està acosando telefonicamente al pana @LuisCarlos. Ya basta!

@NSC: Parapolicías le ofrecen “trato VIP” a @LuisCarlos http://bit.ly/x9jvIL Si se equivocan x allí la respuesta también será VIP y global.

@acianela: El inaceptable acoso a @LuisCarlos RT @IPYS Venezuela: Periodista y ciberactivista es amenazado telefónicamente

Luis Carlos Díaz had written about this escalade before. In this article [es], from September 2011, he says:

La acción dejó de ser una travesura cuando el grupo N33 emitió un comunicado, leído en el canal del Estado, VTV, en el que “aclaraban” que accionaron por razones políticas en contra de cuentas que criticaban al presidente de la República y por lo tanto cualquier opositor con visibilidad mediática estaría en la mira.

It's been stated that the group, even when they call themselves “hackers”, should not be considered this way, since they apparently obtained the first sets of password using techniques such as social engineering and by mere guessing passwords that were weak to begin with. However, since they have taken over the account of a recognized Venezuelan “white hat” hacker RaFa Núñez, it's now being suspected that they might be acting under the collaboration of a Venezuelan government-owned ISP.
In a public message [es] that has been replicated across different Venezuelan blogs, Luis Carlos has said:

Nos enfrentamos a una nueva forma de ciberguerra más focalizada, de desactivar individuos sin mancharse mucho las manos, de afectar la libertad de expresión en Internet y acabar con las críticas gubernamentales. Este es una suerte de paramilitarismo digital, en el cual se buscan personas externas, e incluso espontáneos, para que eliminen gente en redes sociales.

Written by Sonia Doglio · comments (8)
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It takes all the running you can do, to keep in the same place.

This translates into the observation that, in a system of two interacting entities with opposite interests, each of them will intend to counter-act the other and will get into a bidding dynamics to achieve more and more sophisticated ways to fight and/or circumvent the opposite part's attacks. This description of a trench welfare competition applies very well to the one between two political entities (remember the Cold War…), or between a repressive government and its citizens struggling for freedom.

With this respect, getting ‘behind enemy lines' is a serious advantage. Happily, 2011's Chaos Computer Congress (CCC) was on his 28th edition named “Behind Enemy Lines”. The 28C3, as it is called for shortness, was thus constituted by a myriad of talks and workshops discussing what is to be behind enemy lines. To put it clearly, this idiom is quite ambiguous: for repressive governments, the freedom fighters are the enemy, and vice and versa.

Chaos radar, CC-by 2.0, photo by johnflan

The Congress opened with a keynote from Evgeny Morozov. I'd like to spend some time on this presentation, for a certain number of reasons. First, I was curious to know how Morozov would approach the topic of internet and freedom given his book “The Net Delusion”. In it, he harshly criticised what he referred to as a “cyber-utopian” movement that believes that – to put it bluntly – technology is the solution of every social and political issue. Morozov actually would have aimed at arguing that technology is not necessarily good, that it can very well be used to surveil and enslave as well as to liberate and empower, but this idea seemed discredited by all the “cyber-utopian” attack**.

That is why I was curious to attend this talk and see where it was going, what the angle of attack on technology in general and the internet in particular was to be. In the really tech-savvy atmosphere of the CCC, with all the Arab Revolutions as a background of 2011, with all the whistle-blowing around Western companies providing spying technology to dictatorships and with respect to the ‘behind enemy lines' leitmotiv, it was a really interesting how Morozov would address the “marriage from Hell”: this “secret love affair between dictators and Western technology companies”.

To be honest, it was an insightful and tempered summary. So, as Morozov puts it, the suspicions about cooperation between democratic and tyrannical governments are not new, but they had very often been rejected as conspiracy theory compliant feud because of a lack of robust proofs. Well, this year saw a turning point: some documents were actually discovered which clearly showed that technology companies were selling spying materials to oppressive governments. This transformed the idea of some abstract technology probably used by dictators into a concrete list of (mostly) Western corporations providing them with surveillance and censorship gear. And precisely because of these official proofs, the mainstream media picked the piece and began digging into.

I'll skip here the – unfortunately and infuriatingly – long list of companies developing surveillance and censorship technology and their respective clients. There is another question that stems from immediately: how to regulate this business activity, how to prevent these companies from selling that gear? Well, the first approach Morozov addressed was: “why not banning them?”. The answer he brought: bans are efficient if global, but it is extremely difficult to implement such policies and, more importantly, ensure they work well. As an illustration, you may think about the US trade embargo on Syria, that prohibits exports other than food and medicine. And still, BlueCoat, a US-based company, continuously sells surveillance and censorship technology to Syria. In the same time, EU-based companies such as Area S.P.A. (Italy), Utimaco Safeware AG (Germany), Qosmos (France) among others are not subjected to legal questioning when selling this kind of technology to Syria. Some of you may still raise an objection that the EU banned arms sales to Syria as a sanction (May 2011): yes, but the latter does not include surveillance gear.

Ok, let's assume for a moment that now, these legal flaws are obvious and supranational legislators from the US and the EU would decide to work on a coherent set of regulatory rules. This is just a hypothesis that may very well not be validated, right, but even if it came to be, it still doesn't handle the other countries. Because there are many more countries in the world than the US and the 27 EU member states. As Morozov aptly invoked it, a recent article in the Washington Post told about a surveillance technology companies fair and estimated the participants to a total of 43 countries. So, what happens if a US/EU-based company sells its gear to, say, Moldova or South Sudan?*** And no, it is not a typo: the 5-month old country of South Sudan is already on the market for surveillance technology…

I am not sure whether it is extremely useful to get into details of how difficult implementing sanction policies actually is. Either their scope is too broad, in which case governments mostly get away; and on the top of it, these policies go overboard and harm citizens in their banal everyday use of the internet as an edge effect. Thus, various Syrian governmental sites are hosted in the US or Canada, but it has already happened for instance that ordinary citizens are unable to buy Skype credits… Or, conversely, the scope of the sanctions can be narrow, which generally ends up being ineffective since governments can set up a great number of shell companies.

Does all this mean there is no solution? Of course, not. Morozov talked about the “know-your-customer” rule, which is coherent with the EFF's proposal for companies to monitor their customers for possible human rights abuses. He observed that we could learn from other (controversial) industries: it is thus probably easier to buy surveillance technology from a US company than to open a bank account in the US (because these banks have been prompted to thoroughly check out their clients, which does not respect customers' privacy and is a kind of additional surveillance). Similarly, EFF's proposal builds a framework of a recommended way to go: technology companies must investigate who their potential customer is, both prior to and after the sale, and stop transactions if concerns arise that the technology is used in activities that violate human rights. With respect to reality, however, this corporations' self-restrain resembles more a point from a wishlist rather than an actual regulation…

We could think of another, directly related, question: Morozov asks how much of the regulation should/could be delegated to technology. In other words, is fighting fire with fire a reasonable way to go? He cites two examples: kill switches and Websense. In the former case, we can think of the viability of remote kill switches and thus, a refusal to run updates may be implemented based on location. In the latter case, Websense periodically monitors where their technology is used: they declare 40,000 customers worldwide and claim that if they were to be used in Syria, they would switch off. This all brings us to the remark: how easy is it to defend fighting surveillance with more surveillance?

And even though some dictators were toppled, it is “too soon to call for victory in the Middle East”, warned Morozov. In Lybia, for instance, the current transitional government ordered the ban of porn sites whereas they were authorized under the Gaddafi regime. Despite a greater transparency regarding censorship in Tunisia, deep packet inspection (DPI) is still widely in use. Last but not least, SCAF – the Egyptian almighty military junta – has been arresting and subjecting to military trials individual bloggers, some of whom are sentenced and still imprisoned.

Morozov expanded this global overview at this point including Eastern European countries such as Russia, Belarus and Moldova as well as China. He pointed out to some recent developments from the CSTO side. The Collective Security Treaty Organization, or CSTO, “a sort of a NATO block of countries from the former Soviet Union” as Morozov defined it, apparently got scared from the Arab Revolutions and would like to do all its best to prevent similar uprisings from happening on the territory of its member states (namely, Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazhakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). Morozov thus highlighted the commitment of the CSTO to sign the “list of steps aimed at securing the cyberspace of the member states“. Moreover, reported Morozov, CSTO's Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha declared that the point of the document is “to prevent the usage of modern information technologies for destabilization of the situation in the CSTO member states… The work on information counter-action is one of the priorities of the CSTO's activity”. Even though we haven't noticed these countries actively buying surveillance gear so far, this quite clear statement suggests that they may be its new customers soon.

#28C3 in Lego, CC-by-NC-SA 2.0, photo by dajmonpills

As aforementioned, Morozov talked about another disturbing development: China's involvement in the spread of cheap technology. He showed a picture from Huawei's implantation in Africa as it used to be in 2006. I was unable to find an update of this map on Huawei's website, so I went through their publicly available documentation

Since entering the market in 1997, Huawei has established four regional headquarters, 20 representative offices, two R&D centers and six training centers across Africa. Huawei's fixed assets investment in Africa over the past decade has exceeded USD 1.5 billion.

As of January 2009, Huawei has more than 4,000 employees in Africa, 60% of whom are locally recruited.

The outcome is quite straightforward: according to the 2006 data, there were 14 representative offices within the African continent. Above, Huawei reports a total of 20 representative offices, which suggests an increase of 50% for the time frame 2006-2009. Additionally, they report 2,000 employees in Africa in 2006 and (at least) the double in 2009 which is a 100% increase within 3 years.

This seems to be insufficient to the Chinese giant, as appears from Morozov's talk. Indeed, he told about the $9.5-million aid that China supplies to Moldova that is aimed to economical and technological development. The latter includes video-surveillance, allegedly for traffic regulation. For some reason thus, Moldova benefits from the benevolence of the Chinese government, and gets millions of dollars of financial aid and video-surveillance technology for free. As Morozov pinpoints it, this gear may also reveal very useful to identify people in cases of protests, as for instance these happening in 2009.

China is also extremely careful about the efficient “traffic management, long-distance education and local security” in Belarus. Thus, video-surveillance technology is also provided although the extent to which this is subsidised by the Chinese government remains unknown. Lastly, it is unclear how much this material is used for political monitoring…

A puzzling phenomenon that Morozov briefly discussed is the increasing number of Western academics who receive funding from the Chinese government to set up NGOs and hire people to label and annotate street surveillance images. The example here is with The Lotus Hill Institute created in 2005 by an UCLA scholar with funding from the Chinese government. But why does academia enter in this field? Well, technologies for automated facial recognition, data mining, etc. require huge academic expertise. Thus, both universities and governments are eager to invest into, without necessarily taking into serious account the geopolitical implications of these activities.

Towards the end of his keynote, Morozov argues that the point we should very seriously consider is the link between the spread of surveillance gear and the domestic surveillance debate in democratic countries. Indeed, these technologies have not been specifically created for the Middle East, but rather for home surveillance. In other words, building specifically tailored tools for surveillance in democracies has further implications as these reach other countries. He pointed to a very thought-provoking opinion letter by Tatiana Lucas, World Program Director at Intelligence Support Systems (ISS) that “encapsulates this debate really well”. This piece was in response to a priorly published article by the Wall Street Journal on “a new global market for the off-the-shelf surveillance technology that has arisen in the decade since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001”. Mrs Lucas writes that such articles as the latter will have a negative effect on the job market in the US and claims the following:

We are concerned that the article and others like it contribute to an atmosphere where Congress isn't likely to pass an updated lawful-interception law. The law would require social-networking companies to deploy special features to support law enforcement. Without the update, the opportunity for U.S. companies to develop and launch intercept products domestically for eventual export will be greatly curtailed.

As Morozov summarized it, this particular paragraph made the following points: first, “if dictators need help in suppressing democratic uprisings, we are here to help”. Second, since such media coverage might give a negative image to this particular domain, the chances this has an alleviating effect of the job creation appears real and worse: “our dictator-helping jobs are going to China!”. And last but not least, the third statement is that the US needs of law enforcement policies are the major driver of this surveillance market. Morozov continued by encouraging us to “attack and ridicule” these “we-are-here-to-help” arguments.

This was a logical and smooth transition to what Morozov referred to at “the most important bit”, namely: “getting foreign policy right”. The focus on technology and sanctions shouldn't prevent us directing the pressure on the foreign policy debate into the right direction. In other words, we should contribute to broad the current debate: for instance, it is quite fashionable to speak ill of Iran since it is a widely known black sheep, but in the same time Saudi Arabia is a very good friend of Western countries. Similarly, there are serious reasons to believe that Gaddafi bought surveillance and censorship technology from the French company Amesys while visiting the then-newly elected president Sarkozy back in 2007, when Gaddafi was considered as an ally…

Thus, the future challenges are not only to focus on the easy target that is Iran, but to engage into a broader debate. For instance, Washington approved a $60-billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia in 2010 and in 2009 EADS (the European Agency of Defense and Security) proudly announced that they became the prime contractor in a huge deal aiming to ensure the security of the totality of the Saudian frontiers… Moreover, a $53-million arms sale to Bahrain is currently under consideration in the White House while deadly crackdown on protestors is ongoing.

What can we do for this? As activists and citizens, we can engage into civil surveillance of the surveillance technology and system:

• by helping Telecomix's BlueCabinet, BuggedPlanet.info, etc. gain deeper insight;
• by collecting evidence about transactions and lobbying activities: Morozov cites here the “Lobbying Tracker”;
• by keeping an eye on national and local media;
• by checking funding agencies. A very interesting example here is the case with Boston Common withdrawing from Cisco because they could not get satisfactory replies about human rights management;

etc.

Here ends part 1 of my walk around ‘enemy lines'. To be continued with part 2 that will tell about “How Governments Have Tried To Block Tor”…

—
* Carroll, Lewis (1960, reprinted 1998). ”2 The Garden of Live Flowers”. Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There
** The Guardian published a long review from Cory Doctorow where he dismantles a whole bunch of points and I really recommend you (re)reading it.
*** It is exactly what happened: BlueCoat claimed to have sold its products to a distributor in the UAE, allegedly to be shipped to Iraq, so they somehow ignore how the technology ended up in Syria…

Written by Malicia Rogue · comments (1)
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